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Richard M Patton, FPE

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THE CRUSADE AGAINST FIRE DEATHS INC.



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Fighting To Protect You And Your Family

Patton's 'Crusade Against Fire Deaths Inc.' started in 1976 when he sent 3,000 'Smoke Alarm Fraud' reports to Fire Chiefs and fire Engineers across the USA.

Patton's relentless 30 year fire industry Crusade was the inspiration behind the new documentary '*Stop The Children Burning*' (see the last page for more).

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Why the 'Evil Trio of Fire' is Responsible for 100 Deaths at the Station Night Club

Following the Station Nightclub fire the Rhode Island fire officials were successful in naming and convicting some “fall guys” for the loss of a hundred lives and injuries to about two hundred more. This has been the fire regulatory system's standard operating procedure (SOP) to large-loss-of life fires over the past one hundred years. Shift the blame to whoever is standing close by and be sure to exonerate the fire officials.

After all, if fire officials are the cause of the loss of life that means **government** is responsible. This could lead to legal problems, possibly criminal charges, etc. There were two fundamental reasons for the deaths and injuries at that nightclub. They were:

1. The installation of highly combustible acoustic wall covering sometimes referred to as “solidified gasoline”.
2. The absence of a fire sprinkler system in a place of assembly.

My first exposure to the killing ability of **highly combustible interior sheathing** was at an annual meeting of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) following the Hartford Hospital fire of December 8, 1961 (16 dead). This fire started at the discharge of a laundry chute in the basement of the building, presumably caused by a lit cigarette in bedding. The fire went up the chute exiting through a defective laundry chute door. The flames then ignited the highly combustible ceiling tile which was installed in violation of the building code. The low density ceiling tile, once ignited, flashed down the corridor trapping hospital patients in their rooms.

The responsible fire chief, who was being criticized for the loss of life, gave a talk at the following NFPA convention. His intent was to deny responsibility. Fire officials had taken the same combustible tile, installed it in a fire resistive test building and ignited it.

The pictures the chief presented showed huge amounts of **white** smoke exiting the test building. The smoke that killed the people in the hospital fire was reported as being **black**. The chief explained that the difference in color was due to using the “**right**” mastic (glue) to fasten the tile to the ceiling during the testing. (Actually, it is likely that color difference was due mainly to an inadequate fresh air supply within the hospital, causing incomplete combustion.)

The chief then claimed that the **black** smoke was much

more deadly than the **white** smoke. Therefore, the contractor who used the “wrong mastic” was the party responsible for the deaths. The chief claimed that his inspectors could not be held responsible for some contractor using the **wrong** glue to hold the tile to the slab. But I had read that test report and rose to mention that the **white** smoke had actually been determined to include **higher** levels of toxic gases; plus the heat created was more than adequate to kill. However, while the chief was roundly applauded I was strongly rebuked at the end of the session. This was an early lesson in the mind set of Club Fire. The club must be defended even if the end result is a failure to correct a problem and further deaths will occur down the line.

Following World War II, for many years, millions of square feet of low density fiber-board ceiling tiles (extremely easy to ignite, incredibly fast burning) were sold in construction supply stores for the do-it-yourself construction projects in homes. How many homes were converted to tinder boxes, how many kids burned because of it is anybody's guess. At the time I raised hell over the unnecessary carnage and finally (not due to an excess of humanitarians in the field), the selling of this highly flammable ceiling tile ended.

The mystery is, after so many decades of deadly fires caused by **flammable sheathing** and **flammable decorations** (Example: Cocanut Grove Nightclub fire of 1942, 492 dead) being installed in homes and places of assembly, how on earth could the supposed “fire experts” of Rhode Island be so oblivious to the endangerment? When there is a dispute between a building owner and the fire authorities, always the fire guys make like they are **infallible** in these fire matters. Then, when deadly fires occur, who should be the ones to blame, the building owner or the “**experts**”?

That flammable wall sheathing was not all that much different than a child's wading pool sitting on the stage floor filled with gasoline. How many fire officials visited that club while failing to check on the flammable nature of the obviously unusual wall covering? Of course, it is a lot easier to be incompetent or irresponsible when it is also easy to force someone else to take the fall for the disaster.

Even with the use of that acoustic wall sheathing in that night club, **if there had been a fire sprinkler system in that building everyone would have returned home safely**. Yes, the fire officials tell us that the building was built before sprinklers were required. But, has there been a change in occupancy or structural changes made since then. If so, why did not the “fire experts” require sprinklers at those times?

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But it is not the failure to require sprinklers that is so damning; it is the fire regulatory strategies employed over the many decade, *deliberately designed to prevent to the installation of sprinklers in nightclubs, nursing homes, high rises, hospitals, hotels and even homes, that is the crime of the 20th century that calls out for retribution.*

The three organizations that cooperated in the anti-sprinkler policies that were responsible for most fire deaths during the 20th century were the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), Underwriters' Laboratories (UL) and the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC). I call them the **EVIL TRIO OF FIRE**.

In Australia and New Zealand, where the most complete record keeping of the performance of the fire sprinkler system was maintained, over a one hundred year period the heat detector operated fire sprinkler was 99.5 percent reliable at controlling the early fire and only 11 fire deaths occurred in sprinkler protected buildings. Thus, it is clear that if fire sprinklers were allowed in *all* buildings the fire departments would have few fires to fight and the businesses that depend on fires for their profits (including the fire insurance industry) would see their profits plummet.

How did the **EVIL TRIO OF FIRE** conspire to keep sprinklers *out* of nearly all **Life-At-Risk** type properties? Here's a few of the ways:

1. Set the minimum required water supply for the system at five to twenty times that needed.
2. Set the minimum diameter of the steel pipe supply line at four inches. Often larger pipe sizes up to eight inches were required.
3. Require roof overhangs and many other areas not needing sprinklers to be protected.
4. Require the use of steel pipe only, which resulted in over sizing to compensate for the near certain internal corrosion that would occur.
5. Impose extremely high water company installation charges for the unnecessarily large sprinkler supply mains and then charge extremely high periodic charges for the "available water", even if the presumed water flow to control a fire never occurred.
6. Even when there is more than adequate water in the street main to supply a sprinkler system, do not allow it to be installed unless the huge "hose stream" water demand fore the fire department also is available. (If we do not get *our* water for hose streams, let the place burn).
7. Often require a separate water supply for sprinklers (other than a city main), which could include an elevated water tank at a cost of 50 to 100 thousand

dollars. An alternate was a UL listed "fire pump" (with expensive related apparatus) and a water reservoir plus (sometimes) a complete pump house; the combination costing up to 50 thousand dollars or more. This "code mandated rip off" included regulatory prohibitions against the use of in-line small commercial centrifugal pumps that would be more reliable and more than adequate to supply any fire sprinkler system for a Life-at-Risk type property, at an installed cost of less than one thousand dollars.

8. Enforce a code requirement that four sprinklers are needed to cover a 16x16 foot room, even long after it was proven that one sprinkler could cover a 20x20 foot room or more.
9. Set the "approval criterion" for sprinkler performance at Underwriters' Laboratories so that if a mere trace of water was thrown beyond an 8 foot perimeter below the sprinkler, the sprinkler failed and was rejected. This artificial restriction on the allowed coverage of a sprinkler provided "justification" for the NFPA code forcing the installation of four sprinklers where one would more than suffice. This "rigging" of the sprinkler code to force sell an excess of sprinklers into any Life-At-Risk compartmented building also reduced the reliability of the American sprinkler system to control a fire in any building.
10. Although a separating wall between two rooms in a nursing home, hospital, motel etc. is required to be at least a half hour rated fire barrier, the NFPA code was written to usually set the sprinkler system water demand based on 3000 square feet of area, even if that involved four or more fire barrier separated rooms. Obviously, only sprinklers within one room, *at most*, would open.
11. The average number of sprinklers that actually opened during fires within the Life-At-Risk type occupancies was *less* than two heads, which would have been adequately fed by ten gpm per head. But, the NFPA design criteria could demand water for 20 or 30 sprinklers. Then, the sprinkler in a small closet was required to discharge as much water as the large room sprinklers, which greatly magnified the requires water delivery and the pipe sizing.
12. Whereas a water supply of 50 gallons per minute (gpm), was proven to be most adequate for sprinklers within Life-At-Risk type properties including multi-family housing, those who plotted to keep reliable built-in-protection *out* of the Life-At-Risk buildings (where nearly all fire deaths occurred) created regulations that often allowed fire departments to set 2,000 or 3,000 gpm, or sometimes more, as the *minimum required water for hose stream. Then fire officials frequently prevented the installation of*

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- sprinklers if the total F.D. water demand was not provided.* Of course, properties served by small water mains and limited water flows for fire fighting were *most in need* of sprinklers.
13. The few national fire sprinkler installation companies that controlled the market loved the big-water-requirements because that prevented the use of already installed domestic lines for supplying sprinklers. Thus the code “justified” costs for *auxiliary water supplies* costing sometimes as high as a hundred thousand dollars. The connections to a city main, the UL designated “fire pump” and elevated water holding tanks often produced costs well in excess of the internal sprinkler installation.
 14. The “artificially justified” excessive water supply criteria and the mammoth sized pipe (where inch and a quarter size and smaller would do fine) had the added advantage of excluding plumbers from competing in the sprinkler field. Plumbers traditionally used *smaller* copper and plastic pipe that has *low friction loss characteristics* and delivered more water per unit diameter size. As opposed to steel pipe, the pipe normally used by plumbers did not corrode internally and was less subject to earthquake damage. By creating an NFPA code that forced the use of huge and hydraulically oversized pipe with major corrosion and earthquake problems, the many thousands of available plumbing businesses were taken out of the sprinkler field. A special category “pipe fitter” became the designated sprinkler installer.
 15. A major ploy in creating enormously costly and less than reliable fire sprinkler systems was to key system design to an incredibly low 7 psi at the sprinkler orifice (sometimes even lower due to anti-engineering design methods). A too low design pressure combined with a too large orifice (for the Life-At-Risk type occupancy) produced a weak spray pattern (poor coverage) and large drops (greatly reduced heat absorption ability). This was like a hose stream from a garden hose without a nozzle. Thus, sprinkler failures within America were far more common than outside the U.S.
 16. Many properties were supplied with very high pressure water and plenty of it, but the regulations were written and enforced so that the high pressure *would not count toward reducing pipe sizes.*

The schemes by which fire sprinkler installations were maintained nearly always (about 99 percent) *not to be used for protecting life within the Life-At-Risk type properties* required the cooperation of all three of the **EVIL TRIO OF FIRE**. Underwriters' Laboratories rigged the laboratory testing and certifications to restrict the coverage of sprinklers. Also UL justified large and

easy to corrode steel pipe while restricting the use of the “plumbers” pipe.

UL also helped create regulations that set fire pump prices at up to ten times the cost of practical and reliable “non-UL-listed” pumps. *As for the IAFC participation, the fire chiefs were the “enforcing agency”.* Because the NFPA/UL controls virtually eliminated the installation of sprinklers to protect human life for many decades, the fires were numerous and the annual fire deaths rates were high. In the absence of any **within-the-building** system that would result in an early warning (which would allow prompt manual termination of the still tiny fire) or, even better, systems that would *automatically* terminate the threat, the fire services became “the only game in town”. The rewards are obvious.

In fairness, it must be said that the rank and file fire fighters played no role in corrupting of the fire codes. And most fire chiefs are like lower level officers in the military; they do not set policy. They enforce the established codes and policies while assuming that they are honest. Generally, the vast majority of the fire officials played no role in the NFPA fire code making operations, and were not solicited by corrupt businesses seeking ways to manipulate the regulations to their favor.

However, when clear evidence of corruption is provided to local and state officials, and they continue to promote defective products without disclosing the defects to the public, they also become partners in the crimes. And, although it is a standing policy of government to blame “others” for the mistakes of government, it also is a crime to “cover-up” the truth to avoid blame.

When the true causes of a fire disaster are concealed to hide the errors of government employees, this breeds similar disasters in the future. There are courageous fire officials who will tell the truth even when it goes against official policy. For example, the fire chiefs of Vermont are leading the way by promoting **honest** fire detectors in that state.

For man years I battled the creators and enforcers of the corrupt American fire regulations that barred the installation of affordable sprinklers for the protection of life. I forced many changes to be made including the concept that sprinklers are a “life safety” system. But it was at great personal cost and the battle has not yet been fully won.

I could continue listing many more ways by which the fire codes for sprinkler designs were rigged and prostituted to severely restrict the installation of the most reliable “protector of life against fire” ever created. And as illustrated so clearly in Rhode Island, following the Station Nightclub fire, **THE EVIL TRIO OF FIRE**

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(NFPA/UL/IAFC) continues to obstruct the installation of fire sprinklers in places of assembly.

Whereas nearly all the places of assembly within Rhode Island needing fire sprinkler systems (due to efforts by the R.I. Governor to make the state a safer place) could be protected using the ***already installed domestic water lines***, this has been disallowed. Charges of 10, 20 to perhaps as high as 40 thousand dollars to bring new "fire lines" into the buildings are being quoted before any of the costs for interior piping are considered. Many other code mandated obstructions are also being employed. So, the intent is clear. ***The fire services are preventing affordable sprinkler installations in Rhode Island even as they give lip service to the need for sprinklers.*** Then, when the owners initiate legal actions to prevent being forced out of business, the media blames the owners for resisting the extreme costs of protection.

What is the explanation for the anti-sprinkler orientation of the fire code system? It boils down to one factor. ***FIRE IS A BUSINESS.*** Fire creates at least 200 billion dollars a year in products, systems, manpower and other related expenditures. The downtown area of Fresno, California was fully sprinklered due to a building official name Joe Randall.

He often gave talks reporting that the number of fire stations and manpower was half of what a normal city of equal size would require. When he would talk about this at NFPA conventions he would expect the fire chiefs to go back and campaign in their own towns for more logical sprinkler criteria. I would tell him, hey Joe; you are convincing them to ***not*** install sprinklers.

A tiny fire is easy to snuff out. It is like a tiger cub, easy to kill, but not yet able to kill you. If all homes contained a fire sprinkler system the fire loss in America probably would drop by more than 90 percent, perhaps by 98 percent. To many in the fire business, that is very scary.

A complete and reliable fire detection system in all homes would not only near eliminate fire deaths in homes. It would allow the great majority of home fire to be snuffed out while still small, thus making the remote fire station less essential. So, that's why a phony type, ionization smoke detector, has been sold into about 90 million homes. The ionization type, so called smoke detector is the detector that is of least worry to those who need fires. By keeping built-in protection ***OUT*** of buildings, the tiny fire is allowed to grow to be a large and deadly fire. It is the big and the deadly fires that feed the fire regulatory system.

Now, let's get back to the faults of the Rhode Island

fire officials relative the 100 dead at the Station Nightclub. When the fire officials say that no sprinklers were installed "because they were not required at the time the building was built", I say, sprinklers were not required at the time because ***your predecessors*** were doing everything possible to ***prevent*** them from being ***installed***.

And, if there is one thing that is clear during the time following that terrible fire it is this: you fire officials, who are in power today, are doing ***everything in your power to sabotage the plan of the governor to make Rhode Island a fire safe state.***

Further, if you think a nightclub fire that killed a hundred people is a terrible thing, realize this: A ***phony*** smoke detector, which is actually a "***products of combustion*** detector, was marketed as a supposedly true "***smoke***" detector beginning during the 1960s. This fraudulent marketing of a defective device was made possible with the cooperation of Underwriters' Laboratories. UL created a ***falsified laboratory test*** for testing the ability of the device to warn of real, visible, ***large particulate smoke of the type created by a smoldering fire.*** To the reader this may not have clear meaning.

However, the 70,000 deaths and about 350,000 fire injuries over the past four decades, ***due to a phony smoke detector failing to sound when there was still time to escape, or not sounding at all, should be real meaningful to the readers of this report, especially those who have lost children to fire with phony smoke detectors in the home.***

For a clearer understanding of the endangerment foisted on unsuspecting families, go to www.AquariumTest.com.

They are the 'EVIL TRIO OF FIRE' as far as I am concerned. I am speaking of the NFPA/UL/IAFC combine.

All of these organizations had a great abundance of evidence, more than 25 years ago, to show that the smoke detectors that they eventually promoted into more than 90 million homes in America, were as phony as a three dollar bill and a menace to human life.

The majority of the 400,000 plus victims of this fraud were aged 15 or less.

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Today, when one child is raped and murdered it becomes a media sensation, which is appropriate. But, why do the media continue to ignore the horrendous death toll due to wide scale corruption within the fire regulatory system? It seems "fire safety" is killing more people than our wars.

Perhaps this most horrendous fraud and the consequences deserve as much media attention as the war now in progress. Certainly the deaths of Americans by fire are far more numerous than our battlefield casualties. But, regardless as to whether the media will continue to ignore these crimes, **YOU** should realize that the so called "smoke" detector that **you** have in **your** home... **IS A KILLER!**

Finally, if you find it difficult to believe that the **EVIL TRIO OF FIRE** would help sell a severely defective fire detector to you, while also concealing the defects that so frequently cause it to fail to sound, all you have to do is to go to www.AquariumTest.com. See this twelve minute film and your doubts will disappear.

However, when you do so, you may begin to wonder about the other "safeguards" that presumably protect you and your children from fire.

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For more information read
'America's Deadliest Cover-Up Exposed'
www.FireCrusade.com/docs

The Crusade Against Fire Deaths Inc.

THE CRUSADE

“In 1980 The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) said they could take no other course but to recommend photoelectric smoke alarms. Since then, despite overwhelming evidence of defects, more than 50,000 deaths and 250,000 injuries have occurred in homes ‘protected’ by ionisation alarms”.

Richard M Patton, F.P.E.



For more information about the Crusade visit us at:

www.FireCrusade.com

THE FOUNDER



Richard M Patton
Fire Protection Engineer

In August 2001, the 'Fire Protection Contractor' Magazine named Richard M Patton, *'Person of the Year'*. Patton's 'Crusade Against Fire Deaths' started in 1976 when he sent 3,000 *'Smoke Alarm Fraud'* reports to Fire Chiefs and Fire Engineers across the U.S. Patton's relentless 30 year fire industry crusade was the inspiration behind the fire safety documentary *'Stop The Children Burning.'*

“What Dick Patton has to say ... should be the starting point for a full-fledged investigation ... at a senior government level - with qualified professionals...”

Garth Stouffer, Manitoba Sun Newspaper

EXPERT WITNESS

Mr Patton has been involved in court cases involving death and injury as a result of defective fire protection equipment. In every case when Mr Patton has laid out the evidence against the fire industry the case has been settled out of court in favor of the plaintiff. Mr Patton is available at:

Crusade Against Fire Deaths Inc.


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About Mr. Patton's
Credentials,
Experience and
Endorsements.**



The Radioactive Ionisation Smoke Alarm
THE SILENT KILLER



CRUSADE POSITION STATEMENT

“The Crusade contends that decades of scientific testing, and evidence from tens of thousands of ‘real world’ fire deaths, substantiates conclusively that the ionization type smoke detector is proven to be defective in BOTH smoldering and flaming fires!”